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INTRODUCTION
Construction clients lack the motivation 
to actively participate in health and safety 
(H&S) programmes in the construction 
industry. Anecdotal views seem to indicate 
that the possible reasons for their lack of 
participation may include the view that 
clients do not suffer loss directly in the 
event of an accident. A question arises 
therefore as to what would motivate clients 
to actively participate in H&S programmes. 
Economic incentives have been reported to 
produce favourable results with other H&S 
stakeholders. However, there is no reported 
evidence on the effectiveness of economic 
incentives on clients. Therefore it was 
necessary in the current study to investigate 
the effectiveness of economic incentives to 
influence clients to actively participate in 
H&S programmes and hence improve H&S 
performance.
Literature informs that the use of 
incentives as a method to promote a 
culture within which technical and pro-
cess innovation can flourish is critical to 
project success (Tang et al 2008). Similarly, 
economic incentives have been shown to 
yield positive results in H&S performance 
(European Agency for Safety & Health at 
Work 2010). It is in view of this that Elsler 
and Nikov (2003) contend that there is a 
need for economic incentives to proactively 
promote H&S.
Some of the reasons why economic 
incentives have been contemplated include 
the failure of strict regulatory approaches, 
the costs involved in bringing organisations 
to courts for non-compliance and the low 
level of fines which have failed to encourage 
organisations to comply (Elsler & Nikov 
2003). However, it is also acknowledged 
that economic incentives are only effective 
when they are directed at organisational or 
national level (European Agency for Safety 
& Health at Work 2010). Consequently, the 
economic incentives may entail linking 
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fiscal incentives, such as lower accident 
insurance premiums or tax rates, to a good 
H&S performance for an organisation. 
Other methods to incentivise, for example, 
employers to implement H&S, may include 
matchup funds where a grant is given to an 
employer equal in amount to the amount 
to be spent on H&S, or linking an incentive 
amount to a voluntary audit or inspection 
(European Agency for Safety & Health at 
Work 2010).
In order to achieve the desired goals 
from the economic incentives, their design 
and use should take into account the 
constraints and risks of a project, organ-
isation or indeed the nation. Incentives 
should make risk allocation fairer, because 
incentives can be seen as the sharing of 
rewards for good performance, and this may 
motivate the participants to perform better 
(Tang et al 2008).
The reason why economic incentives are 
said to work on the contractors’ side, or are 
seen as one of the solutions to proactively 
improve H&S, is partly because of the cost 
of ensuring H&S, which is usually borne 
by the contractors (Elsler & Nikov 2003). 
Contractors work at reducing the cost in 
order for them to remain competitive. Bishop 
et al (2009) rightly argue that the unaccept-
ability of occupational H&S performance of 
the building and construction industry can 
be attributed to the powerful competitive 
forces in the industry, which ultimately 
work against H&S. He observed that the 
industry strives to complete projects on time 
in order to reduce costs, and too often H&S 
is neglected. The solution may be a cultural 
and behavioural change, and this may only 
come about by harnessing the competitive 
forces in the industry to work for occupa-
tional H&S.
Both organisations and government 
departments at times lack the requisite 
resources, and this inhibits a meaningful 
improvement of H&S. A lack of resources 
or underfunding for H&S programmes 
limits any action. For example, in Tanzania 
less than 1% of the Labour Department’s 
budget was allocated to occupational H&S 
(Kamuzora 2006). This kind of allocation 
can result in a low capacity to enforce 
legislation, and failure to conduct inspec-
tion and surveillance. According to Cotton 
et al (2005), contractors, or indeed other 
stakeholders, are unlikely to see the need of 
implementing H&S without the application 
of incentives or sanctions, especially in 
developing countries.
The benefits of incentives are clear. The 
European Agency for Safety and Health 
and Work (2010) demonstrated from a case 
study of six organisations in Europe that 
improvements of 25% to 70% were possible 
with economic incentives. However, for the 
incentives to be effective, they should be 
provided by national and or international 
organisations. Consequently political will is 
necessary for the national or international 
organisations to be involved.
The use of economic incentives to 
improve H&S performance in the construc-
tion industry in general has been investigat-
ed by various scholars. However, few studies 
have looked at the impact of economic 
incentives for construction clients, espe-
cially in the developing world. Therefore it 
was necessary to investigate specifically the 
impact of the economic incentive on clients’ 
H&S performance. Studies have shown that 
economic incentives have produced posi-
tive results for contractors and employees. 
However, it is not clear how economic 
incentives would impact the H&S perfor-
mance of clients. The focus was therefore 
placed on clients, because they can influ-
ence project H&S performance (Huang & 
Hinze 2006).
THE STUDY
A Delphi study technique was used to 
explore the impact significance of economic 
incentives on clients’ H&S performance. The 
Delphi method was preferred to common 
survey methods, as the current study was 
addressing the ‘what could happen if ’ kind of 
question as opposed to the ‘what is’ kind of 
question (Hsu & Sandford 2007). The Delphi 
method was also considered to be much 
stronger for its rigorous query of experts, 
which is achieved through many iterations 
and feedback.
The Delphi study involved 11 panel 
members. This number of panellists was 
considered adequate based on what other 
Delphi studies have used and recom-
mended. Delbecq et al (1975) suggest that 
10 to 15 panellists could be sufficient if the 
background of the panellists is homo genous. 
A review by Rowe and Wright (1999) 
indicates that the size of a Delphi panel has 
ranged from three to 80 in peer-reviewed 
studies. Okoli and Pawlowski (2004), and 
Skulmoski et al (2007) also mention a panel 
size of about 10 to 18 members. Hallowell 
and Gambatese (2010) suggest a minimum 
of eight panellists. Based on the above, 
and the fact that the Delphi method does 
not depend on statistical power (Okoli 
& Pawlowski 2004), but rather on group 
dynamics for arriving at consensus among 
experts, a panel of 11 members was consid-
ered adequate.
However, the choice of panel members 
was critical. Delphi is a group-decision 
mechanism requiring qualified experts who 
have deep understanding of the issues (Okoli 
& Pawlowski 2004). Therefore one of the 
most critical requirements is the selection of 
qualified experts, as it is the most important 
step in the entire Delphi process because it 
directly relates to the quality of the results 
generated (Hsu & Sandford 2007). In view 
of the above, successful panel members 
had to meet a set of criteria which included 
qualification, experience, publication record, 
and capacity and willingness to participate in 
the study.
Panel members were identified from 
three sources. The first source was the 
CIB W099 register of members located on 
the CIB WO99 website (CIB 2010). The 
CIB W099 is a working commission that 
was set up by royal appointment to enable 
researchers on construction H&S in the 
world to collaborate and protect H&S. The 
second source was the conference proceed-
ings of the CIB WO99 from 2005 to 2009. 
Individuals who had frequently appeared as 
authors or keynote speakers were identified 
as potential experts for the study. The third 
and last source was identifying, through 
references, individuals working in the area 
of H&S in the local construction industry in 
southern Africa.
The panel consisted of two members 
from South Africa, three each from the 
United States of America (USA) and the 
United Kingdom (UK), and one each from 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Sweden. All the 
panellists specialised in construction safety. 
In terms of their current occupation, three 
of the panellists were employed by con-
tracting organisations, two by consulting 
organisations, and six by universities. All 
panellists held very senior positions in their 
organisations and were involved in commu-
nity service. The panel had a cumulative of 
243 years of experience. The lowest number 
of years of experience was seven and the 
highest 45.
The calculated mode of years of experi-
ence was 15, the mean 22.1, and the median 
15 years. Experience was an important fac-
tor in determining who an expert was, and 
therefore the minimum number of years 
was set at five. In terms of publications, 
ten of the panellists had published in peer-
reviewed journals, conference proceedings 
and books. Between them, they had pub-
lished 57 books and monographs, 19 chap-
ters in books, 187 peer-reviewed academic 
journals, 345 recent conference papers and 
341 other publications comprising articles 
in professional journals, technical reports, 
policy papers, expert witness documenta-
tion and keynote addresses (Table 1). In 
addition to their publications, the panel had 
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led and managed 108 funded research proj-
ects. Three panellists served on the edito-
rial boards of 43 peer-reviewed journals and 
conference proceedings (Figure 1).
The Delphi study involved three rounds 
of an iterative process before consensus 
between the panel members on the impact 
significance of economic incentives on 
clients’ H&S performance was reached. 
Panellists were requested to rate the prob-
ability that clients would implement H&S 
elements as a result of influence from 
external environmental factors, including 
economic incentives. The probability scale 
ranged from 1 to 10 representing 0 to 100%. 
Further, panellists were requested to rate the 
impact of external environmental factors on 
client performance. The impact scale was 
based on a 10-point rating scale ranging 
from low to critical. This aspect indicated 
the severity of a factor.
A two-stage analysis of data from the 
Delphi was conducted using Microsoft 
Office Excel, which is a spreadsheet soft-
ware programme. The first stage involved 
analysis to establish or confirm consensus 
on responses to the predetermined criteria. 
This involved determining the group medi-
an responses for each question. After the 
third round of the Delphi, absolute devia-
tions (Di) about the group medians (m(X)) 
of each rating for every question were cal-
culated using Equation 1. In addition, mean 
absolute deviations (MAD) were calculated 
for every question. This is a calculated 
mean of all absolute deviations for all panel-
lists about the median on each question. 
Further analysis involved determining the 
statistical range in ratings by panellists on 
each question, and the percentage of panel-
lists with a similar opinion inclination on 
each and every question. Consensus was 
determined to have been achieved when the 
MAD was less than one unit below or above 
the group median, the range in ratings on 
each question between all panellists was 
below 4.0 and the percentage of panellists 
that were of a similar inclination in opinion 
was 60% and above on a particular question.
Di = [xi – m(X)] (1)
Where:
 Di = Absolute deviation
 xi = Pannelist rating
 m(X) = Measure of central tendency
The second stage of Delphi data analysis 
involved determining the impact significance 
of environmental factors on client H&S 
performance. The significance of the impact 
of environmental factors was categorised 
as critical, major, moderate, minor or low. 
The categorisation was helpful in determin-
ing which environmental factor was more 
critical to client H&S performance. The 
impact significance of a factor was obtained 
as a product of the overall rated probability 
(likelihood) that an environmental factor 
would influence clients to implement H&S 
elements, and the rated negative impact 
(severity) on clients’ implementing the ele-
ments that would result if the environmental 
factor was absent. This relationship is illus-
trated in Equation 2.
Impact Significance = Likelihood × Severity (2)
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Broadly, the study constituted two research 
questions relative to the influence of 
economic incentives on client H&S perfor-
mance. In the first question, the experts 
were requested to provide a rating, and reach 
consensus, on how likely (probable) clients 
would be to implement the following H&S-
related elements if economic incentives were 
to be in place:
 ■ Provide finance for H&S implementation
 ■ Appoint an H&S agent
 ■ Provide H&S staff
 ■ Choose a procurement method suitable 
for H&S
 ■ Become involved in design review
 ■ Conduct H&S inspections and audits
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 ■ Implement H&S policies, procedures and 
goals, and
 ■ Provide H&S leadership.
The second research question required 
the panel of experts to rate and reach 
consensus on what they determined to 
be the impact on clients’ H&S culture in 
the absence of economic incentives for 
clients to implement H&S. This particular 
question sought to establish whether the 
client H&S culture would be better with 
an application of economic incentives for 
clients to implement H&S. Findings to the 
questions raised in the study are presented 
in the next section (Results) and discussed 
later in order to inform the conclusions and 
recommendations.
RESULTS
The influence of external environmental fac-
tors on client H&S performance was evalu-
ated. The external environment was defined 
by six factors, namely: political, social, 
economic, legislative, professional bodies and 
technology. The impact significance of these 
factors’ influence on client H&S performance 
was obtained as a product of clients’ likeli-
hood to implement H&S elements, and the 
severity rating or negative impact on clients’ 
H&S performance if the factors were absent.
The level of influence was determined 
by assessing the extent to which a client 
would implement various H&S elements if 
pressured by the external environment. The 
severity of an environmental factor was the 
rated negative effect on client H&S perfor-
mance that would result from the absence of 
an environmental factor. The severity rating 
was based on an ordinal scale of 0 to 10, with 
0 being negligible and 10 critical. The impact 
significance was obtained as a product of the 
severity rating of an environmental factor 
and the likelihood of the client implement-
ing a particular H&S element (refer to 
Equation 2).
Of the six environmental factors, three, 
namely political, economic and legisla-
tive, were determined to have an impact 
significance of over 5.0. The economic and 
legislative factors had an impact significance 
of 7.77 each (Figure 2). According to the clas-
sification scale used in this study a rating of 
7.77 was considered to be ‘critical’. The rating 
suggested that an economic incentive was 
critical to a client implementing the required 
H&S elements or programmes.
The likelihood of clients implementing 
H&S elements as a result of the external 
environment’s influence was 67% on average 
(Figure 3). The standard deviation in the 
likelihood ratings was 0.06. The small stand-
ard deviation suggested that the likelihood of 
the client implementing the H&S elements 
was almost the same.
Clients were least likely to be involved in 
design and planning of H&S activities. The 
likelihood for this element was determined 
to be 60% (see Figure 3). On the other hand, 
clients were most likely to conduct H&S 
audits and inspections, and have H&S poli-
cies, procedures and goals. The likelihood 
for these H&S elements was determined to 
be 76% each. However, with economic incen-
tives, clients were more likely to implement 
the H&S elements, with an average likelihood 
of 86% (Figure 4).
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With economic incentives, clients were 
‘very likely’ to implement all the H&S ele-
ments (Figure 4). In comparison, the average 
likelihood that the client would implement 
H&S elements as a result of the influence of 
political, legislation, social, technological and 
professional bodies was 63% (Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
Findings from the study indicated that 
economic incentives had a critical impact 
significance on client H&S performance, and 
that clients were very likely to implement 
H&S elements with economic incentives 
when compared to other factors such as 
political influence. These findings col-
laborate with that of the European Agency 
for Safety and Health at Work (2010). The 
European Agency for Safety and Health at 
Work demonstrated from a case study of six 
organisations in Europe that improvements 
of about 25% to 70% were possible with eco-
nomic incentives. It is envisioned therefore 
that similar results may be obtained when 
clients are incentivised, considering that the 
study found that clients were very likely to 
implement H&S elements (above 80% likeli-
hood) if economic incentives were present.
Economic incentives may be effective 
to motivate clients to participate in H&S 
management. Without economic incentives, 
clients may continue to consider themselves 
not critical H&S stakeholders, and might 
therefore not participate effectively in 
implementing H&S. According to Cotton 
et al (2005), stakeholders are unlikely to see 
the need of implementing H&S without the 
application of incentives or sanctions, espe-
cially in developing countries.
The current study found that economic 
incentives had almost the same impact on 
H&S performance as legislation. However, 
it has been observed that using legislation 
alone to influence clients to implement 
H&S elements may not achieve the desired 
results. Using legislation alone is problem-
atic, because in most parts of the world the 
ineffectiveness is not necessarily with the 
legislative regime that is in place, but with 
its enforcement. In the United Kingdom, the 
House of Commons noted that, although 
breaches of H&S regulations are serious 
criminal offences and legislation provides for 
penalties, courts have tended not to impose 
the maximum penalties available (House 
of Commons 2004). In South Africa the 
problem of enforcement was also identified, 
describing it to be inadequate (CIDB 2008). 
A need therefore arose to establish other 
forms of incentives in addition to legislation.
Legislation can facilitate the implementa-
tion of economic incentives for clients. The 
role that the legislative environment can 
play to facilitate economic incentives on 
both public and private clients is to have 
the requirement enshrined in the laws. It is 
easy to allocate finance if there is pressure 
from regulations, for example by demanding 
that financial allocation for H&S should be 
specified in the proposal. That would enable 
the client to ensure that finance is actually 
allowed for this purpose, and consequently 
a contractor would not be able to question 
client demands when the client is only 
complying with legislative requirements 
(Törner & Pousette 2009). It is clear that, for 
economic incentives to work, the regulatory 
framework has to be in place that specifically 
addresses its implementation. According to 
the European Agency for Safety and Health 
at Work (2010), regulation and economic 
incentives are complementary. Therefore, in 
order to effect economic incentives practi-
cally, appropriate regulation must be in place.
Examples of the measures that regulation 
can address include the requirement for 
clients to be equally responsible for direct 
accident costs. It is argued that in this way 
clients will become aware and have direct 
exposure to accident costs, hence serving 
as an incentive to ensure that measures to 
a better H&S are in place to avoid similar 
future occurrences and loss.
Other examples of economic incentives 
include, for instance, the introduction of H&S 
performance bonds/guarantees which can be 
taken in both clients’ and contractors’ names. 
A facility of this nature would place a practi-
cal and real economic incentive on the clients, 
and indeed on the contractors. The idea of 
a performance bond has worked well with 
contractors to ensure performance on project 
delivery (Meng 2002). A performance bond is 
an agreement between the client, the contrac-
tor and a third party who, in most cases, is a 
bank or insurance entity (Supardi et al 2011). 
In the agreement, the bank or insurance 
institution agrees to pay a sum of money to 
the client in the event of non-performance of 
the contract by the contractor (Abdul-Rashid 
2004). The principle is that the contractor in 
this instance commits himself/herself to the 
client to perform the contract to the client’s 
satisfaction (Ndekugri 1999).
An H&S performance bond/guarantee, 
taken jointly by the client and contractor 
in favour of the state or enforcing agency, 
would cause a paradigm shift in the manage-
ment of H&S in the construction industry. 
Since clients will have a real economic incen-
tive to ensure a good H&S performance, they 
will insist on engaging a contractor with a 
good H&S record, and will further insist on 
employing professional engineers who will 
safeguard their interests.
Professional bodies, such as engineer-
ing institutions, also have a role to play in 
making economic incentives practicable. 
Professional bodies sit on boards to draw 
up and or review standard contract forms 
which are used in the construction industry 
as contract documents between clients and 
contracting entities. Economic incentives 
such as the H&S performance guarantee 
can be incorporated in the standard forms 
and hence make it a contractual obligation. 
Engineers, who in most cases are designers, 
have influence on how H&S is managed 
(Smallwood 2004).
Therefore appropriate economic incen-
tives can work for clients, just as they have 
for contractors and individual workers in the 
construction industry (Elsler & Nikov 2003; 
Goodrum & Gangwar 2004).
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
It can therefore be concluded, based on the 
findings in this study, that economic incen-
tives should not be overlooked in trying to 
get clients involved and becoming accounta-
ble for H&S implementation. With economic 
incentives, clients are likely to implement 
all H&S elements on a project, and are also 
likely to assume leadership in H&S and put 
H&S programmes in place.
It has also been concluded that economic 
incentives will have a significant impact on 
client H&S performance. Therefore, when 
a number of measures are considered to 
improve H&S standards in the construc-
tion industry by influencing client H&S 
performance, economic incentives may not 
be overlooked. The only other factor with 
similar impact significance was found to 
be legislation. Although political, social, 
technology and professional bodies have 
influence on clients’ H&S performance, eco-
nomic incentives were found to have a more 
significant impact.
While the findings in the current study 
suggest that economic incentives have a 
significant impact on client H&S perfor-
mance, it does not, however, suggest that 
other factors, such as legislation, political, 
social and technology do not matter. On the 
contrary, the findings suggest that economic 
incentives may not be omitted from a list of 
other factors that also need to be considered 
and applied in order to motivate clients so 
that they might be effectively involved and 
become accountable for H&S management in 
the construction industry.
The current study recommends therefore 
that ways to incentivise clients be explored, 
including the prospect of implementing 
the H&S performance guarantee. Although 
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regulations, such as the 2014 Construction 
Regulations in South Africa impose far-
reaching requirements on clients, research 
informs that, due to low fines and a lack of 
enforcement, the desired benefits may not be 
realised if the complementary role of finan-
cial incentive is not exploited.
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